The mark, the thing and the object : on what commands repetition in Freud and Lacan by Van de Vijver, Gertrudis et al.
fpsyg-08-02244 December 20, 2017 Time: 16:59 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY








Paris 8 University, France
Stéphane Thibierge,
Université Paris Diderot Paris 7,
France
*Correspondence:





This article was submitted to
Psychoanalysis
and Neuropsychoanalysis,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 19 September 2017
Accepted: 11 December 2017
Published: 22 December 2017
Citation:
Van de Vijver G, Bazan A and
Detandt S (2017) The Mark,
the Thing, and the Object: On What
Commands Repetition in Freud
and Lacan. Front. Psychol. 8:2244.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02244
The Mark, the Thing, and the Object:
On What Commands Repetition in
Freud and Lacan
Gertrudis Van de Vijver1* , Ariane Bazan2* and Sandrine Detandt2
1 Centre for the History of Philosophy and Continental Philosophy, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, 2 Service de
Psychologie Clinique et Différentielle, Research Center for Clinical Psychology, Psychopathology and Psychosomatics,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
In Logique du Fantasme, Lacan argues that the compulsion to repeat does not obey
the same discharge logic as homeostatic processes. Repetition installs a realm that is
categorically different from the one related to homeostatic pleasure seeking, a properly
subjective one, one in which the mark “stands for,” “takes the place of,” what we have
ventured to call “an event,” and what only in the movement of return, in what Lacan calls
a “thinking of repetition,” confirms and ever reconfirms this point of no return, which is
also a qualitative cut and a structural loss. The kind of “standing for” Lacan intends
here with the concept of repetition is certainly not something like an image or a faithful
description. No, what Lacan wishes to stress is that this mark is situated at another level,
at another place, it is “entstellt,” and as such, it is punctually impinging upon the bodily
dynamics without rendering the event, without having an external meta-point of view,
but cutting across registers according to a logics that is not the homeostatic memory
logics. This paper elaborates on this distinction on the basis of a confrontation with what
Freud says about the pleasure principle and its beyond in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
and also takes inspiration from Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. We argue that
Lacan’s theory of enjoyment takes up and generalizes what Freud was after in Beyond
the Pleasure Principle with the Wiederholungszwang, and pushes Freud’s thoughts to a
more articulated point: to the point where a subject is considered to speak only when
it has allowed the other, through discourse, to have impacted and cut into his bodily
pleasure dynamics.
Keywords: Freud, Lacan, repetition compulsion, jouissance, fort-da, beyond the pleasure principle,
representation, dopamine
INTRODUCTION
It is well into his life as a practicing psychoanalyst that Freud wished to come to a firmer theoretical
grounding of the clinical observation that people do not necessarily want to get rid of their suffering
or their symptoms. Against therapeutic efforts of all kinds, people time and again repeat, even
cannot not but repeat, what makes them suffer. This is what Freud means by Wiederholungszwang,
the compulsion to repeat, situated, so he says, beyond the pleasure principle. In the text with
the same name, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1955), he explores the theoretical
underpinnings of this clinical phenomenon. The idea he defends here is that the principle of
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repetition, and not the pleasure principle, is the most basic
module of mental life, grounded in the drives. Freud is bold in
his clinical affirmation – yes, the basic module of mental life is
the compulsion to repeat, and not the pleasure principle1 – but
he clearly does struggle to articulate the Wiederholungszwang in
relation to the pleasure principle.
In Logique du Fantasme, Lacan (1966–1967/2017) invites us
to consider that Beyond the Pleasure Principle constitutes a
“conceptual intrusion” in Freud’s work. He insists: “Do we really
measure what is at stake here?” To him, the Wiederholungszwang,
articulated in terms of jouissance, enjoyment, constitutes a
genuine break with the pleasure principle, a contradiction even
with what Freud would have thought until then to be the module
of the functioning of the mental system, namely homeostasis,
that holds that living substances always seek the state of minor
tension. To Lacan, there is no doubt about the fact that the
pleasure principle reissues homeostasis for mental life: the mental
system, in as far as it is ruled by the pleasure principle, “echoes,”
“repeats,” “redoubles” organic, homeostatic requirements.2
In this paper, we propose to clarify what is at stake in
Lacan’s diagnosis of a “conceptual intrusion” in Freud’s text.
We argue that Lacan’s theory of the signifier and of enjoyment
basically takes up and generalizes what Freud was after in Beyond
the Pleasure Principle with the Wiederholungszwang, and that,
notwithstanding the overt differences in style – Freud being more
versed into biological metaphors and concepts, Lacan more into
logical and topological formalizations – it is not the case that
Lacan’s theory of the signifier with its focus on formalization
is far removed from the apparently more bodily concerns of
Freud. On the contrary, Lacan pushes Freud consequently to
the point where the act of speaking itself is shown to involve
an ineliminable place of the speaking other, while also having
a subversive impact on what constitutes the homeostatic bodily
pleasure dynamics.
This paper has two parts. In the first part, we explain what
Lacan means with the idea that we are thinking with the object.
This is important to come to clarity about his account of
the signifier as participating in the dynamics of pleasure and
1See, for instance, the end of II, where Freud speaks of tendencies beyond
the pleasure principle, “more primitive than it and independent of it” (Freud,
1920/1955, p. 17), or at the end of III, where he states that the compulsion to
repeat is “more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure
principle which it over-rides” (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 23). We note the unhappy
translation of triebhafter into more instinctual – the translation of Trieb by drive
would have been more accurate. Luckily, this is remediated in the new translation
from the upcoming Revised Standard Edition, edited by Mark Solms. A critical and
annotated version of Beyond the Pleasure Principle has meanwhile been published
in Psychoanalysis and History (Freud, 1920/2015).
2“Quand Freud introduit pour la première fois, dans son Jenseits à lui, l’Au-
delà du principe du plaisir, le concept de répétition comme du forçage, Zwang,
répétition, Wiederholung – cette répétition est forcée: Wiederholungszwang –
quand il l’introduit pour donner son état définitif au statut du sujet de l’inconscient,
mesure-t-on bien la portée de cette intrusion conceptuelle? Si elle s’appelle ‘au-delà
du principe du plaisir,’ c’est précisément en ceci qu’elle rompt avec ce qui, jusque-là,
lui donnait le module de la fonction psychique, à savoir cette homéostase qui fait
écho à celle que nécessite la substance de l’organisme, qui la redouble et la répète
et qui est celle que, dans l’appareil nerveux isolé comme tel, il définit par la loi
de la moindre tension. Ce qu’introduit la Wiederholungszwang est nettement en
contradiction avec cette loi primitive, celle qui s’était énoncée dans le principe du
plaisir” (Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, séance XI, p. 134).
repetition. To this end, we draw on Freud’s clinically interpreted
anecdote of fort-da, and on Lacan’s re-interpretation of it in
his seminars The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis
(Lacan, 1963–1964/1973) and La Logique du Fantasme (Lacan,
1966–1967/2017). In the second part, we clarify and critically
discuss how the use of signifiers introduces a radical cut
organized around the limit points of the pleasure principle.
Here, we depart from the distinction Freud introduces in his
Project for a Scientific Psychology between understanding and
judging, having it correspond, respectively, with the realm of
representational, grasping bodily movements and the functioning
of the mark, seen as a precursor and initiator of the properly
subjective realm, with, between both, a relation of fundamental
contingency or arbitrariness that serves as the ground for the
compulsion to repeat.
TO THINK WITH THE OBJECT: FREUD
AND LACAN INTERPRETING THE
CHILDREN’S GAME “fort-da”
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud re-discusses the fort-da
children’s game3 to make it clear that the compulsion to repeat is
not just to be equated with the repetition of painful events. Both
the compulsion to repeat and the repetitive children’s games are
related to the dynamics of excitations and their discharge, that is,
to the pleasure dynamics. But they are so in a different way.
As early as Freud (1895/1966), proposes in his Project for a
Scientific Psychology that homeostasis, the process that seeks the
state of minor tension, is the default mode of mental functioning.
This means that the mental system seeks in the first place to get
rid of tension, that is, it is after the restauration of a previous
state of less tension. Freud acknowledges of course that there is
no mental functioning on that basis alone, because the mental
apparatus also needs to be able to retain tension for a sufficient
timespan, and it needs to be able to do this in organized ways,
otherwise there would be no way of acting effectively in the
surrounding world.4 The reality principle is what captures this
requirement of retaining tension in order to adequately act and
maintain oneself in the world. Both the pleasure principle and
the reality principle, however, are eventually seeking a decrease
in tension.5
3cf. Freud (1900/1953, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 461) and Freud (1920/1955,
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, II, pp. 14–17). The game concerns a young child
(Freud’s grandson) that used to play with his toys in such a way that he makes
them disappear out of his sight, pronouncing then the long sound o-o-o. One
day, while lying in his cradle, the child plays with his a bobbin, throwing it over
the edge, pronouncing o-o-o again, and then, pulling the bobbin back in his little
bed, triumphantly greets it with a-a-a. The two sounds are interpreted by Freud as
expressing respectively fort and da, away and back.
4That corresponds to the function of the ego. The ego cannot function but as
a set of ‘permanently activated neurons,’ i.e., neurons that can retain excitation
“Thus the ego is to be defined as the totality of the ψ cathexes, at a given time, in
which a permanent component is distinguished from a changing one” (cf. Freud,
1895/1966, Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 323).
5That is why they can be said to be both operating in function of the death drive,
as Freud explicitly admits in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1955), VII,
pp. 62 ff. In “The economic problem of masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962), however,
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The question is, of course, how much tension the mental
system will or should be capable of retaining, and why or
how it will do so. This matter is at the core of the Freudian
distinction between the pleasure principle and the compulsion
to repeat. In discussing the fort-da game, Freud stresses that the
child, by staging the presence and the disappearance of his toys,
compensates for the anxiety and the pain that the absence of the
mother is provoking in him. The game repeats the supposedly
painful event, which suggests that there is no immediate relief
of tension involved. Freud, however, does not hesitate to say
that the indemnification at stake involves a direct benefit. It
concerns a different kind of pleasure though, one stemming
from another source (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 17). The difference, so
Freud explains, has to do with the fact that the child succeeds in
being less passively subjected to what he experiences, has found
ways to actively master, that is, to bind excitations through the
throwing away and pulling back of his bobbin and the repetitive
“o-a,” fort-da. In this way, discharge is enabled, while a distance
is created with drive satisfaction. The use of “o-a” – that Lacan
refers to as signs, marks – is what makes the mastering drive
independent of whether the memory was itself pleasurable or
not (Ibidem, pp. 16–17).6 However, even if the child’s mental
Freud equates death drive with the Nirwanaprinciple, the pleasure principle and
the reality principle as its modified form, with the representatives of libido.
6Several comments are in order here. Firstly, there is one clear passage in Jenseits in
which Freud speaks of the importance of the trait (the Zug) in relation to repetition:
“This ‘perpetual recurrence of the same thing’ causes us no astonishment when it
relates to active behavior on the part of the person concerned and when we can
discern in him an essential character-trait (Characterzug) which always remains
the same and which is compelled to find expression in a repetition of the same
experiences.” We are much more impressed by cases in which the subject appears
to have a passive experience, over which he has no influence, but in which he
meets with a repetition of the same fatality (Freud, 1920/1955, Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, II, p. 22, italics original). While, in the context of the discussion of fort-
da, Freud stresses in the first place “the use of the object” and talks of pleasure
stemming ‘from another source,’ Lacan explicitly interprets the “o-a” as signs or
marks, in line with the passage we mentioned [for instance in Logique du Fantasme
(Lacan, 1966–1967/2017), XI, p. 136 (italics original)], where he writes: “(. . .)
identité significante du ‘plus’ ou du ‘moins’ comme signe de ce qui doit être répété
[character-trait (. . .) which is compelled to find expression in a repetition],” and
also in The Four Fundamental Concepts (Lacan, 1963–1964/1973), V, p. 54, where
he discusses automaton and tuchè: “(. . .) l’insistance des signes à quoi nous nous
voyons commandés par le principe du Plaisir.” That Lacan speaks of signs might
be confusing, in as far as the sign here is purely formal and is defined in terms
of oppositions. As such, it is what can be understood by the functioning of the
signifier. Clearly, what Lacan intends is something different from more traditional
(philosophical) accounts of the sign where it refers to something for someone
(Peirce), or from cognitive views according to which the sign is what identifies
stimuli on external grounds. With Lacan, following Freud, a sign or a mark is
constituted by parameters or characteristics holding from within the subjective
realm itself. As we explain further in this paper, Lacan speaks here of signs in
reference to the Einzige Zug, which is the symbolic mark, the first signifier, that
indicates that something was lost and cannot but be repeatedly searched for. By
initiating that movement of repetition at the level of the signifiers, the little human
being grafts himself upon the other, and inscribes himself in what Lacan calls le
champ de l’Autre, the field of the Other (cf. Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, XVII, pp.
224–225/p. 136). Even if the distinction between the first and the second signifier,
the Einzige Zug (the “sign”) and the “proper” signifier can only be made from
within the realm of “significance,” the realm of the functioning of the signifier,
it is nevertheless relevant to logically distinguish that first moment, the one in
which something merely indicates that something was lost without being part of
a differential system of signifiers. Of course, this is a mythical moment, set apart
logically. Unless explicitly specified, we shall from here on speak of signifiers in
order to avoid confusion between the philosophical use of the concept of sign
and the psychoanalytical one. Secondly, to suggest that “another level” is initiated
functioning is independent of the initial objects of satisfaction,
even if the use of signifiers installs the pleasure dynamics at
another level, at another place, there is in Freud’s viewpoint
on mental life still an “echoing,” “repeating,” “redoubling,” as
Lacan states, of organic, homeostatic requirements. The module
of mental life is homeostasis, that is, the pleasure principle.
Lacan’s (1963–1964/1973, p. 60) comments on the fort-da
experiment in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis
are revealing for the questions that concern us here. Lacan is
not siding with Freud’s clinically based distinction between the
repetition at stake in the children’s game – still situated under
the heading of the pleasure principle, albeit distinguished from
mere drive satisfaction – and the “real” repetition he wishes
to consider as lying beyond the pleasure principle, i.e., the
compulsion to repeat. On the contrary, he considers the fort-
da game as an instantiation of what constitutes mental life at
heart, ruled, that is, by repetition, and, therefore, not ruled
by a pleasure principle that echoes homeostasis. In this sense,
repetition, also coined as enjoyment by Lacan, is in his view
not “natural,” not obeying to what instincts or needs command
in terms of pleasurable discharge.7 To Lacan, what counts in
repetition, and what to him is illustrated in the fort-da game,
is the attachment to that which stays the same, namely, the
signifiers, “o-a,” fort-da, endlessly repeated.8 That the repetitive
use of “o-a” takes place in an apparently signifying relation to
a multiplicity of toys, in a variety of situations, is not what
counts in the first place – it rather risks to distract us from its
genuine significance. As a matter of fact, to consider the fort-da
as a stamp of some or other event – the absence of the mother,
for one, as Freud suggests – is too quickly complicit with a
semantic-representational account and thereby misses the real
point.9 According to Lacan, following here Wallon, the child is
when dealing with signifiers, or, with Freud, to talk of pleasure as stemming
from “another source,” is in agreement with the Freudian idea that memory
and consciousness are two different and mutually exclusive systems: opening the
possibility of using signifiers is opening the possibility of memory and immediately
closes off their presence in consciousness. Thirdly, it is worth noting in passing that
Freud speaks in the context of the use of signifiers, as in theater plays, of enjoyment,
Genuβ (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 17) – the subject enjoys the commemoration of
painful events in the play – a thing that will be of importance in the Lacanian
viewpoint on enjoyment.
7The use of terms such as “natural” is never unproblematic. In this context, we take
it that Lacan intends natural as opposed to cultural. We do not want to open the
philosophical discussion on nature/nurture here, but we do want to stress that the
opposition is perhaps less straightforward than Lacan seems to suggest. We will
argue further on that even if the compulsion to repeat is seen to be categorically
distinguished from the pleasure principle grounded in a homeostatic dynamics,
this does not mean that there are no biological constraints to be taken into account.
As a matter of fact, what we intend to show is that the compulsion to repeat, even
if it does not follow homeostatic principles, does have a logic that can be said to be
biologically anchored and is clearly linked to precise biological constraints (Bazan
and Detandt, 2013).
8This is perfectly in line Freud’s “perpetual recurrence of the same thing,” stated in
Jenseits, albeit not in the passage where we find fort-da. See footnote 6 for the full
quote.
9The term representation (as well as meaning, content, . . .) is extremely tricky.
It is not the place here to unfold its various (mainly philosophical) traps and
potentialities, but in relation to Lacan, it can be said that the representational
realm mostly goes hand in hand with meaning, content, semantics, all of the
imaginary order, against which he warns time and again. This is not per se the
most adequate or the most interesting option though. We explain further on an
alternative viewpoint on representation, one that is more radically embedded in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2244
fpsyg-08-02244 December 20, 2017 Time: 16:59 # 4
Van de Vijver et al. The Mark, the Thing, and the Object
vigilant for what it experiences as a lack exactly next to him,
in his vicinity, not where the mother left the room and where
he could expect her to come back. In other words, the child
does not constitute its mental life on the basis of, for instance,
a “representation” referring to the mother leaving the room,
expecting that she will come back at some point through the
same door.10 It is in the vicinity where the lack makes itself
directly felt that the play with the bobbin and the utterance of
“o-a” take place. As the bobbin, the “o-a” is actually the little
thing that is detachable from him while being still retained, the
little thing on the basis of which the infant explores and expands
his universe in a movement of self-mutilation – throwing the
thing, part of his own movements, away, and thereby bridging
the abyss created by the absence of what was in his vicinity a
moment before “It is with his object that the child jumps over the
borders of his territory changed in wells and that he begins the
incantation” (Lacan, 1963–1964/1973, p. 60, our translation).11
The little subject of the fort-da, successfully finding discharge
through the act of repetitively pronouncing “o-a,” is in the
repetitive movements he initiates with his bobbin and covers
with “o-a”.
So, in sum, Freud grounds the pleasure principle in the
possibility of discharge, and quite logically considers the child’s
game as a successful kind of discharge. What to him lies beyond
the pleasure principle, has to do with those occasions where
discharge appears to be problematic or radically impossible,
such as in traumatic neuroses or in the phenomena of
negative transference. To Lacan, however, this clinically observed
distinction risks to miss the essential point, namely that in the
the dynamics of the body, and that understands representations as motor forms
that correspond to the central imagery that arises from action intentions that
did not completely lead to discharge (see Jeannerod, 1994, p. 201; Bazan, 2007,
pp. 125–126). The point we wish to make in relation to the above passage, is that
in repetition, it is not the content that counts, but the form. As Lacan indicates, the
child jumps toward the “o-a” in a movement of bridging what appeared as a lack
in his vicinity. To interpret this “o-a” as a “representation” referring to the mother
leaving the room, expected to come back through the door, adds too much and
too quickly elements of content. What Lacan wishes to indicate, clearly in line with
Freud – who also, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, notes that the child is not in
panic at the moment the mother leaves the room – is that it concerns a throw and
pull-movement, i.e., a movement of the acting subject, doubled, over-written by a
phoneme sequence, “o-a,” a signifier which is first and foremost a motor form. For
more details (see Bazan and Van de Vijver, in preparation).
10Here, is an example of how tricky the term representation can be. It is here
used between inverted commas to highlight its traditional philosophical sense, i.e.,
something that stands for something for someone: the child fears that the mother,
whom he saw leaving through the door, will perhaps not come back. Following
our viewpoint on representation, and following also Lacan and Wallon in the
interpretation of the case, we would say that the activated motor-pattern of the eyes
while the mother left the room constitutes the representational structure, formal
in nature, and that it is exactly that pattern that is repeated in the play with the
bobbin and the accompanying “o-a”: the movement of throwing the bobbin away
and pulling it back repeats the movement of something being at one point in the
vicinity and at another point leaving a void in its absence.
11In line with Aristotle, Lacan will add here that man not only thinks with his
object, he is, as a subject, where the object is put into practice This probably refers
to Aristotle’s (1984) idea that the mind is “none of the things existing in actuality
before thinking” (De Anima iii 4, 429a24). In other words, thinking is nothing in
actuality in abstraction of the form that thinks. Or still, our thinking is only with
our objects of thought, that is, the forms. And that is precisely what is at stake here,
and what we explain further on: “o-a” are formal objects that correspond to, or
“stand for” actions tied together into motor packages that, in their opposite nature,
organize what can be called subjective life.
signifying procedures whereby the child, or any speaking being
for that matter, deals with absence and presence, there is a
structural loss, a structural impossibility that inescapably emerges
with the use of signifiers, with the use of “o-a.” This structural
loss is not disconnected from the issue of discharge, and thus of
pleasure, but does initiate another domain, obeying a different
logics, a logics ruled by repetition. In order to make this clear, we
have to explain how the use of the first signifier is connected to the
pleasure dynamics, or rather, how it cuts with that dynamics and
how it gives rise to the functioning of a new domain. To that end,
we need to reconstruct and articulate in more detail how the child
is caught into his movements, and how he finds an orientation on
that basis.
THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE AND
BEYOND
Understanding and Judging
We know that pleasure is seen by Freud as discharge of tension;
it is a temporary, floating, and partial suspension of displeasure.12
Tension – displeasure, if not trauma – constitutes the background
against which pleasure has to be thought. We also know that
as long as we live, there is, structurally, the encounter with
unpleasantly high levels of tension (Freud, 1895/1963, 1895/1966;
Lacan, 1963–1964/1981). Within this setting, the first air entering
the respiratory system, the first milk entering the digestive
system, can likely be called traumatic experiences. What exactly
is at stake in these experiences?
What Freud writes in his Project for a scientific psychology is
relevant here. Freud makes a distinction between understanding
and judging, that he grounds in the idea that the complex of
what surrounds the child, the fellow human being in the first
place, falls apart into two components, one which “makes an
impression by its constant structure and stays together as a Thing,
while the other can be understood by the activity of memory –
that is, can be traced back to information from [the subject’s]
own body” (Freud, 1895/1966, p. 331, italics original). So, to
understand, is to find relief in and through the proper bodily
movements, that is, to succeed in grasping something (com-
prehensio), so that, by one’s own means or not, an effective
handle is found on the basis of which discharge becomes possible.
To judge, on the other hand, refers to something that resists
understanding, a thing that for that reason “stays together as
a Thing” and impresses by its constant structure, and that is
to be covered and bridged by other means, with what Freud
refers to as traits or marks (Züge). To Freud, that is what
judgment does: it corresponds to the impossibility of finding
adequate movements that would lead to a grasp of the complex
(understanding), and constitutes a cut with it by approaching the
12Freudian pleasure, then, is not an affect in the common sense meaning of
the word (namely, a hedonic or agreeable feeling). Freudian pleasure is relief,
not delight. Therefore, it is not concerned with valence as affects are. Without
going into details, we are inclined to see affect, in the common sense, as far less
determining and orienting for behavior than the drive system and as not organized
around the adequacy of the act (for more details, see Bazan and Detandt, 2013,
2015; Bazan et al., 2016; Detandt, 2016).
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complex through a trait, a mark. A judgment is thereby “entstellt”
with regard to understanding, it installs another realm, another
domain.13
We propose to apply this schema to the dialectics between
pleasure and displeasure and to what lies beyond. The potentiality
of this move is twofold: on the one hand, it contributes to
anchoring the functioning of the mark into the dynamics of
pleasure and displeasure, approaching it, so to speak, “from
below,” and, on the other hand, it allows to ground the (f)act
of speaking in the obstacles and the impossibilities the human
being encounters specifically in and through the motor patterns
and their potentiality to lead to discharge. Let us return to our
examples, the entering of milk in particular.
The Thing, the Mark, and Primary
Judgment
What happens in feeding, is that the child, most commonly, finds
by itself the voluntary sucking movements that will contribute
to the feeding.14 The act is what is first, with its motivational
point – from where, why, for what reason it is undertaken – left
unfathomable from within the system that undertakes it.15 As a
consequence of the sucking movement, milk enters the system.
That is, for the system, a surprise. That the movement of sucking,
undertaken, so to speak, “out of nowhere,” would lead to milk
entering, was not foreseen and could not be foreseen. The first
milk that enters the system comes as a surprise, and cannot
but come as a surprise; it constitutes an event: the milk is an
external, a priori hostile element entering the system. However
proximate the entering of milk with the sucking movements is,
both are, for the system concerned, disconnected, in the sense
that there is nothing in the act of sucking that is connected
with milk: their relation is contingent. Also the fact that the
sucking brings a certain relief simply related to the sucking itself,
is initially disconnected from the milk and does not diminish
the surprising effect of the latter. The event of milk entering the
system for the first time is inscribed as a mark, but it is not
understood – the milk “stays together as a Thing.” Our hypothesis
is therefore that what is marked is first and foremost the event
itself: the mark is the point, the punctual point expressing
and inscribing the bodily surprise.16 The mark corresponds, in
13For a more extensive Lacanian discussion of the Thing, la Chose (see Lacan,
1959–1960/1986; Lew, 2014).
14Our schema is also applicable to what happens in breathing, but it is different
in the sense that the child, most commonly, finds by itself, through voluntary
breathing movements, the adequate act that creates a relief of tension. In
breathing – in contrast, e.g., with feeding – there is no constitutive need to for
a contribution of the other, nor is there a difference in timing between finding
the grasping movement (the breathing movement) on the one hand, and the
satisfaction of the drive. We chose for the example of feeding, because it allows us
to more straightforwardly articulate the different moments we wish to distinguish
here.
15This structurally missed step and the ways to retroactively recover it, whereby it
is identified as the cause of our acting, is, actually, the ground for the hypothesis of
the unconscious.
16This event is, so we think, beyond the mechanical part of it, the explosion of
the sugar receptors in the mouth massively and suddenly highly activated. As we
have discussed elsewhere, a physiological marker is proposed for this surprise in
the form of a release of dopamine at the level of the nucleus accumbens, i.e.,
the dopamine peak indicating unexpected reward (Bazan and Detandt, 2013) but
our view, to what Freud called the “Triebrepräsentanz,”17 that
is, the point where the subject allowed for the fact of “being
taken by surprise” and that opens the possibility of returning to
that point. We consider this “being taken by the event in the
form of a mark” as the first step in the process of subjective
positioning, the first or primary judgment, corresponding to what
Freud calls “Bejahung,” or what with Lacan becomes “Bejahung
pure, primitive” (Lacan, 1955–1956/1981, p. 95) or “Bejahung
primaire” (Lacan, 1966, p. 387). It does involve the position
of the subject, albeit in a very preliminary and inviting sense:
the fact that the trait was inscribed as a mark of the event,
witnesses to a subjective choice – the little human let himself be
surprised by the milk entering, it could as well have chosen not
to drink. It therefore opens subjectivation as a task, an agenda.18
However, it is important to note that this logical time of being
struck by surprise, is not exclusive to human beings, but, as
we will explain further on, has to be supposed in vertebrates in
general too.
What happens then with the undertaken movement that has
made the entering of milk possible, and what about the relief to
which it eventually contributed, or not? What role does it play
in this “preliminary subjectivation”? Clearly, this movement, or
cluster of movements, is of no help in understanding the event,
but, being proximate, it gets linked to it, contingently but no
less firmly. It is this link, inherently contingent but factually
proximate, that, in our view, lies the ground for the further
articulation of subjectivity, and of which Lacan will say that it is
the ground for repetition.
What we propose here is that the adjacent movement,
being only contingently linked to the ungraspable Thing of
which the subject is factually experiencing the effects of
surprise, this adjacent movement indicates and covers, “stands
for,” the ungraspable Thing. Freud himself is speaking of
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, a term that caused a huge confusion
among psychoanalysts and scholars.19 Freud sometimes identifies
the Triebrepräsentanz with the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, and
there is something understandable at this. We would be inclined
to say that the first adjacent movement, contingently sticking
to the mark, so to speak, also already belongs to another
also the dopamine release corresponding with disrupting, aversive and traumatic
events (Bazan and Detandt, 2015), taken together as dopamine release ‘marking’
the unexpected event, independent of its valence (Bazan et al., 2016), and leading
to a physiological registration known as ‘incentive sensitization.’
17There can be a hesitation between Triebrepräsentanz and Triebrepräsentant, the
first referring to the function of taking-the-place-of (“tenant-lieu”), the second
to the taking-the-place-of itself. We wish to stress in the first place the notion
of Repräsentanz. We shall see further on the delicate status of this point. For an
extensive discussion of this concept (see Tort, 1966/2016), and for a subtle and
pertinent “mise au point,” primarily in relation to the functional interpretation of
the Repräsentanz (see Lew, 1983).
18It would be possible and relevant to further elaborate on this issue in terms of
alienation, as Lacan himself does all along in Logique du Fantasme. The subject (of
the unconscious) is in “the part that is lost”; it is the subject of “je ne pense pas,”
and that part is what shows itself “by surprise.” In relation to surprise, Lacan refers
to Theodor Reik as the sole analyst having stressed its importance in relation to the
unconscious (Reik, 1935/1976; cf. Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, VII, p. 92, Logique du
Fantasme).
19It was for instance translated as “représentant représentatif ” (Laplanche and
Pontalis) or by Lacan as “tenant lieu de la représentation” (see Tort, 1966/2016;
Lew, 1983, for a discussion).
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realm, namely the realm of movements that can become
representational. The adjacent movement thus carries both sides:
it refers to the Repräsentanz, with the mark taking the place
of the Thing and having the potentiality to elicit Vorstellungen,
representations – these two different logical moments reflect
Freud’s inaugural distinction between judgment at the one hand
and comprehension at the other.
Beyond that first “sticky moment” where the Repräsentanz
remains a pure potentiality – which is, actually, a logical
moment, not a genetically identifiable moment20 – a call for other
types of movements is launched, intentionally directed grasping
movements this time, that are effectuated as a return to what
escaped comprehension. Indeed, the first sucking is a sucking to
discharge the sucking tension, but if it is followed by the event
of the milk coming in21, and if it is thus given the weight of
the mark, the subject can choose to have the next sucking as an
intentionally directed movement, to grasp – i.e., to get – the milk.
In this way, the Repräsentanz is what elicits representational –
i.e., mental – activity. This subjective representational work is a
work of understanding, of com-prehension, or at least, it is an
attempt to understand, to grasp. This work is constituted on the
basis of the marked adjacent movements – marks that are, as
we have argued, the marks of a non-understanding, of a limit
to understanding, that is, a limit to the possibility of grasping
something, a limit to making that something (the milk entering
as a surprise) into an object.
Very much in line with this, Lacan will consider the mark
as the first signifier, S1, corresponding to Freud’s unitary trait,
the “Einzige Zug,” the symbolic mark that constitutes an event
by indicating a cut with the level of what is being marked
(Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, p. 135). The S1 enables the primary
judgment that has the form of an affirmation (Bejahung): it
marks that there was an event that struck the body. However,
to Lacan, the S1 has to be called symbolic already: in order to
be called a mark at all, it intrinsically demands to be deployed
and ever re-deployed through the articulation of representations
that engage with other signifiers.22 If the mark would not have
elicited the subject to a return, it would not be an Einzige
Zug, an S1. S2 then stands for the chain of signifiers that aim
at a return to the first signifier in an attempt to grasp or
understand the initial moment of surprise, and in this sense
corresponds to the representational activity which Freud refers
to as the com-prehensio. Lacan speaks here of a “thinking
20It is certainly not a genetically identifiable moment, as it is a moment of
historization, indicating the registration of the contingency of a subject’s history
in the form of a marked event. We do however think (as indicated in footnote 16)
that there is a physiological correlate to this marking, in the form of a dopamine
release, probably a dopamine spike. Note that if biological correlates can be situated
at precise moments, their mental realization is dynamic, hence the use of the term
‘logical moment’ instead of ‘chronological moment’ (see also Bazan and Detandt,
2017).
21See footnote 16.
22Here, we easily jump from representations to signifiers. However, we propose
that both are logically equivalent. Indeed, a representation (see footnote 7) is
thought as a motor activation rest of an action intention that could not be
discharged in actual motor activation; a signifier, then, is merely the application of
this logic to the act of speaking, i.e., to articulatory phoneme motor patterns. Both
representations in general, and signifiers specifically, are thus motor potentialities,
i.e., forms, without any determined content or meaning.
of return,” a “thinking of repetition” (Lacan, 1966–1967/2017,
p. 135).23 The articulation of this representational realm, its
structuring, is properly symbolic, constituted of representations,
but it is, meanwhile, very much anchored in the body, determined
by what is, along a subjective history, being “accepted and
inscribed” as a mark and what is contingently adjacent to it
as an undertaken movement. In other words, what initiates
the repetition of these actions is not the possible reward or
relief they might bring about. What causes repetition is the fact
that the action is being linked to the event, the event being
constituted by surprise. Note that the marking, with an adjacent
movement being contingently linked up with it, is independent
from whether the event was painful (first air coming into the
lungs) or rewarding (first milk entering the mouth cavity). In
other words, the fact that milk enters the digestive system and
eventually brings relief is secondary to the effect of the event
as such – and it is the latter, not the former, that induces the
repetition.24
What has to be further elaborated, therefore, is what this
movement of “thinking of return” exactly involves, how it is
marking specifically the human being as a speaking being,
with representations becoming genuinely signifiers, and what,
if anything, constitutes, in this context, the difference with the
compulsion to repeat. In order to further unfold this, we need
to turn to the status of the object, its relation to the possibility
and the meaning of discharge, as well as to the role of the fellow
human being in this fabric of pleasure and enjoyment.
The Signifier Inscribed in a Basic
Non-attunement of Actions and Needs:
The Role of the Other
Let us return once more to the question of what happens in the
deployment of directed actions by the subject, knowing that it
must have been historically struck by the event, accompanied
by the experience of the adjacent movement contingently linked
to it. We know that all vertebrates capable of action have to
cope with an initial non-attunement of actions and needs. The
reason for this is structural. Vertebrates are characterized by a
double body: an inner, invertebrate sack-like body with all the
big vegetative systems (respiration, digestion, excretion, etc.) and
a “newly invented” outer body constituted by a skeleton and
striated muscles (see Bazan, 2007). While needs arise in the inner,
23See here Lacan’s discussion of the children’s play with “o-a.” To Lacan, from the
moment the child uses “o” (S1), we cannot but add to it the differential “a” (S2),
revealing the moment of S1 in isolation as a mythical, logical moment. He calls
therefore the S1 symbolic, and states that there is from thereon no grounding to be
looked for in the similarities or differences between objects such as toys, bobbins,
mothers, to identify what a mark is. Nothing of this sort is hidden in the plays of
Freud’s grandson that would justify the use of “o-a,” as nothing of this sort would
justify the marked surprise effect in the child. According to Lacan, a unitary trait
identifies something – in our interpretation, an event – but it is only through the
repetition, in the differential play with other signifiers, that an event genuinely
becomes a subjective event.
24The first events in life frequently lead to the repetition of actions crucial for our
survival, but our intuition is that this is at the bottom of it a matter of chance, not
of teleology. E.g., a pigeon that made a wing movement before receiving a grain
(Skinner, 1948), will from then on also repeat that wing movement because it had
been registered as what had to be repeated, even if it had nothing to do with its
survival chance (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uPmeWiFTIw).
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invertebrate body, the specific actions for the satisfaction of these
needs are outer body actions. The structural non-attunement
between actions and needs resides in the fact that it is not a
priori clear what outer body action could constitute a response
to what the inner body needs. Even if this gap is less prominent
in most vertebrates as compared to humans (e.g., little horses get
on their feet and move toward the mother nipple in the span of
hours after birth), the idea is nevertheless that, even in animals,
this instinct-encouraged movement has to be sanctioned by a
mark (a dopamine-release) to be registered as a movement with
a high potential for repetition, and that therefore, independently
of instincts, the body registers the history of (contingent) events.
Once a specific action has been linked to an event, what drives
to repeat this action, is disconnected from the drive satisfaction
itself. Indeed, the relief caused by the satisfaction of an internal
body need is only contingently connected to what the external
body succeeded to develop as an action. The relief, as the tension
itself, is a serendipitous addendum, a by-product, important for
survival, but not determinative for what drives repetitive behavior.
No matter what the outcome, the child will not stop the endless
repetition, the sucking, or, as Freud stressed, the endless uttering
of “o-o-o” and then “a-a-a.” From the moment the child accepted
and marked the event, it is driven by the repetition compulsion
to grasp. So, it is from within the repetition compulsion that relief
of tension becomes possible – it is not the relief of tension that is the
ground for repetition.
It is often said, from within a psychoanalytical setting, that
what drives the human being is not the satisfaction of needs.
We agree with this. In line with what we elaborated in relation
to higher vertebrates, however, we consider that the structural
non-attunement of needs and actions holds in the same way for
human beings, and that it is intrinsically related to the way in
which vertebrate bodies are constituted. This allows us now to
address the question of the specificity of the human being, as a
speaking being, from a slightly different angle. It is true, indeed, as
Freud already highlighted in his Project for a Scientific Psychology,
that the human child is born in a configuration of helplessness,
which implies that the fellow human being plays a role that
is structurally of the utmost importance in the constitution of
his subjective world. Let us return to our example of the milk.
Up until this point we have brought the scenario as if what is
crucially at stake for the child is the sucking. However, due to
his helplessness, the repetitive action of the sucking is, per force,
supplemented by other actions, e.g., crying, vocalizations, that
contingently, but crucially, contribute to realize the conditions
within which relief becomes possible. Again, what drives the child
to act and repeat its actions is not the possibility of relief in
itself, it is the attempt to grasp what initially escaped, namely
the surprising event. And in this grasping attempt, the other, as
a speaking being, is once more an ineliminable factor. Indeed,
a bunch of contingent movements, situated primarily in the
realm of vocalizations, that, by surprise, out of nowhere, made a
difference (i.e., brought the mother, the milk, relief), doubles, in a
far more whimsical fashion, the logically first contingency of the
sucking movement. Indeed, a mother, with far more fierceness
than, e.g., milk, resists objectification, stays together as a Thing.
More correctly, it is to the extent that the other “stays together as
a Thing” and resists understanding, that the child is launched,
here again, for an endless ‘thinking of return,’ a re-elaboration
of his first vocalizations, in an attempt to grasp after all that
which entered his system as a surprising event and with regard to
which it did not succeed in articulating the appropriate adequate
actions.
We therefore agree with Lacan when he states that the child
thinks with his object, which means that he subjectivizes through
the handlings with his object. We also agree with him (cf. his
reading of “o-a”), that the use of signifiers, and the linguistic,
signifying practices at large have to be understood along the same
lines: a signifier is handled as an object, the object perhaps, on
the basis of which the child explores and expands his subjective
universe. We have explained in the previous part how these
handlings are articulated in terms of a failure in grasping the
Thing, how the marks in a sense “take over,” or at least initiate
a new realm of being, the realm properly constituted by signifiers
(which is the Other, in Lacan’s terms). We remind here that the
signifier is a form, a motor-pattern, only contingently linked to
what brings discharge – indeed, it marks precisely what was not
understood and could not be brought back to memories of the
proper body.
Repetition or enjoyment, a “thinking of return,” as Lacan
calls it, is therefore, for the human being, intrinsically bound
up with the nature of the signifier. The child, in the same
movement of adopting the signifier that is offered to him as a
formal potentiality by the other, inscribes himself in a universe
of vocalizations where it is structurally impossible to grasp the
Thing. It is from there on condemned to run after the Thing,
to commemorate what can be called, perhaps, a moment of
exquisite subjectivity – the structurally escaping moment of
having been struck by surprise. By structurally missing this point
because of the fact that the Thing is situated at another level
and cannot be brought back to bodily understanding, the subject
endlessly, repetitively, runs after “the facts”: it repeats the marks
in themselves, and strives for understanding after all, attempts
to make the Thing into an object, to bring it back to proper
and directed body movements that bring discharge. Both realms,
however much intertwined they are, are disconnected realms,
only contingently bound up. As we saw with the “fort-da” game,
the child produces the first signifiers “out of nowhere,” or at
least, these signifiers cannot be grounded in the distinctions
between his toys, between the mother or the father being absent
or present. There is no way back from signifiers to meanings25:
the relation between form and content is neither innately, nor
naturalistically grounded. As we saw with the first mark, the
Einzige Zug: signifiers emerge at the point where a “naturalistic”
grounding – an adequate grasping of the object, leading to
discharge – reaches a limit. Or perhaps more correctly: the use
of the signifier indicates that a limit was reached, indicates that
the bodily movements were inadequate.
What both Freud and Lacan note in relation to this repetitive
dynamics, a thing that follows logically here, but needs to be
25This is an ironic reference to Russell’s (1905) “On Denoting,” where he says, albeit
from a different angle, but with, in our view, the same stakes at play, that there is
no backward road from denotations to meanings.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2244
fpsyg-08-02244 December 20, 2017 Time: 16:59 # 8
Van de Vijver et al. The Mark, the Thing, and the Object
stressed time and again, is that the action does not at all need to
be adequate to be repeated. This is quite generally what clinical
experience confirms: it may be certified that praying or singing
does not stop the earthquake – it is nevertheless repeated. The
child’s repetitive “o-a” does not impact on the leaving and the
return of the mother, but it is joyfully and victoriously repeated
nevertheless. We have defended elsewhere (Bazan et al., 2016)
that even if the act is not adequate in grasping the thing, it still is
better than sideration or bewilderment; it is the execution in itself
that brings relief. Freud will say it is relief “from another source”;
Lacan will consider that it radically concerns another domain, the
domain of signifiers to which the child finds entrance. And in
this domain, the other, the Other, occupies an ineliminable place:
without the other/the Other, there would be no “significance,”
no functioning of the signifiers. It is a space where contingency,
or rather, arbitrariness between form and content reigns: the
exchanges between the child and the other, in as far as they are
based in signifier exchanges, are firstly formal exchanges, content
being realized in the historical interweaving between those forms,
the adjacent bodily movements and the web of directed and
intentional actions deployed in their wake.
The Object as a Coherent Motor
Package and the Experience of
Satisfaction
What is there to say then about the object? We would be inclined
to consider an object as a coherent motor package, a bounded
set of grasp movements that opens the possibility of discharge.
We already said that the Repräsentanz26 “stands for” the event: it
might be considered as a crystallization of movement parameters
into a solidary whole. It is different from what philosophers
are traditionally inclined to call an object, though, as it is a
contingent whole of movements arbitrarily cut out of a sequence
and has no intentional directedness. However, as argued, the
motor pattern has the potentiality to launch for a return under
the form of directed actions. These actions produce what we
would call in the proper sense “mental” representations of what
first intruded the system and stayed together as a Thing. It are
then these “mental representations” that, when executed, can
lead to discharge, however partial and temporary that is, and
which can, in our view, be genuinely called objects. In other
words, the mental, representational inscription amounts to an
objectification. As this is likely to be the most delicate point of our
argumentation, we dare to insist. Firstly, what we call an object or
a representation is first and foremost a motor pattern, a motor
intention, as Jeannerod calls it (Jeannerod, 1994; Bazan, 2007):
it is the motor form within which something can be grasped.
To address the question of the object, is therefore in the first
place to ask for the formal arrangement of the space of possible
motor patterns. What serves as a filling up in that space – content,
meaning, . . . – is secondary, and does not inform about the
arrangement of the space itself. In other words, questions about
26The difference between Repräsentanz and Repräsentant can once more be
brought forward here: however frozen or crystallized the motor pattern is
(Repräsentant) it is nevertheless a motor-pattern, hence formal, potentially ready
to receive different contents, and thus it is also functional in nature (Repräsentanz).
representations corresponding more or less adequately to some
or other object out there, are missing the point. A representation
is an object, is a motor pattern, and the articulation of the space of
motor patterns, being a constraining space, is at the meantime the
enabling condition for what counts as an object: the constraint is
the possibility.27
This account of the object enables us to address (i) the
typically Lacanian idea of the object as bound up with a structural
loss – the fact of launching comprehending grasp movements is
indicative of, rests on, a step being missed, as we have shown,
the step corresponding to a non-understanding, covered by
the mark – with the object a that theoretically indicates this
ever missed object, (ii) the issue of objective reality, that here
refers to successful grasping movements, i.e., movements leading
to discharge. Clearly, the issue of discharge is crucial in the
constitution of the object. As a matter of fact, only that which
can give rise to discharge has a chance to lead to objectification.
Along these lines, Lacan states that it is impossible to understand
what an object is without the dimension of satisfaction, a thing
that, to him, largely escaped the philosophical tradition.28 There
is, however, a potential confusion in the way in which Lacan uses
the term satisfaction, at least in as far as we take it to refer to
the satisfaction of needs. We have indeed argued that there is
a contingent, arbitrary relation between what brings satisfaction
of needs and what is constituted as an object through motor-
patterns. We have also argued that object-constitution happens
on grounds radically cut from what brings satisfaction of needs.
We are indeed speaking of another level, of pleasure “from
another source” as Freud states, of objects of enjoyment, as Lacan
calls it. In other words, objects of pleasure are not situated at the
level of the satisfaction of needs29! We propose therefore to reserve
the term satisfaction for the level of needs, to talk of objects
of pleasure when we are aiming at the object constitution that
is related to what brings relief, diminution of tension, and of
27The resemblance with Kantian epistemology is straightforward. Kant’s dictum
that “the Thing in itself is not knowable” serves as the starting point for his
epistemology: from the moment we talk about objects and objectivity, we talk about
what there is “for us,” in our words, what is within the range of the graspable
through our motor patterns. Another way of saying the same thing, from within
the formalistic tradition in philosophy (Frege in the first place) is that the grasping
space is a functional space – in line with Kant’s philosophy that articulates the
functionalism of Reason. It is from within the functional space that the place
is prepared, delineated, circumvented, of what can come to satisfy the function.
That place within a functional space, that is the object. In our words: that motor
pattern ready to grasp something, that is the object. The formal discussion that is
relevant in this regard, is the one on the relation between intension (that defines
the function) and extension (that satisfies the function). Lacan works with these
distinctions frequently, not in the least in his Seminar XII, Problèmes Cruciaux pour
la Psychanalyse (Lacan, 1964–1965/2003).
28There is no way, dixit Lacan, to conceive of an object without the dimension
of satisfaction. With regard to the homeostatic, organic account, he says: “Rien,
dans tout cela, qui pousse à la recherche, à la saisie, à la constitution d’un objet. Le
problème de l’objet comme tel est laissé intact par toute cette conception organique
d’un appareil homéostatique. Il est très étonnant qu’on n’en ait pas jusqu’ici
marqué la faille. Freud ici, assurément, a le mérite de marquer, que la recherche
de l’objet est quelque chose qui n’est concevable qu’à introduire la dimension de la
satisfaction” (Lacan, 1966–1967/2017, p. 156).
29It is even questionable whether we can speak of objects of satisfaction; the term
“experience of satisfaction” seems more adequate, even if it also demands to be
further unfolded, certainly in light of the meaning of the term “experience” in the
philosophical tradition.
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enjoyment to indicate the impossibility of relief that the subject
is desperately holding on to.
It is in relation to this that the exchanges with the fellow
human being have to be investigated. Of course, the fellow human
being is essential for what is to be called the constitution of objects
of pleasure. In providing for the essential means of discharge –
carrying out the specific acts – the other structurally intervenes
in the temporality of excitation and discharge of the child, co-
determines the identification of what counts as an object of
pleasure, and in this way also co-determines what lies beyond in
terms of enjoyment. That this has its implications for what counts
as an experience of satisfaction is evident, but the important
thing to note is that it is not the satisfaction that determines
the constitution of the objects of pleasure or of enjoyment.
Rather, the satisfaction of the need, in this new scheme, is
over-written or replaced by the possibility of discharge through
grasping movements leading to objectification, a possibility that
was opened up as a return to the marked event covering that
which stayed together as a Thing. The space of satisfaction of
needs is thereby subverted into a space whereby the subject is
endlessly and repetitively demanding to be recognized at another
“level,” the one of subjectivity, expecting from the other to tell him
the answer, that is, to bring (to be), for him, the object of relief.
CONCLUSION
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud seeks to describe and
articulate the functioning of the psychic apparatus in situ, that
is, anchored in the ways in which human beings sense, move
and act. In discussing the issue of Wiederholungszwang, Freud,
here perhaps more than anywhere else, starts from the clinical
observation of quantities of excitation of which it is not easy, not
possible even, for the subject to get rid. That is where to him
the disjunction between pleasure and repetition finds entrance:
at the point that cannot be silenced through understanding, the
point where pleasure, the possibility of decreasing tension, has
come to a limit, the point that in its insistence searches other ways
out. Freud’s overt biological phrasing is certainly not a matter of
looking to ground the psychical in the biological; it is a matter of
cutting the psychical at the correct joints. And this cutting cannot
but start from the embarrassment in relation to the body, that is,
from the moments and the points where something does not obey
the logics of pleasure and lies beyond it as a compulsion to repeat.
In line with this viewpoint, and taking up Lacan’s revisiting of
it in terms of enjoyment, we have argued (i) that the insistence
with which subjects repeat is to be grafted upon the structural
disconnectedness between what articulates behavior and what
satisfies needs, (ii) that this structural disconnectedness, this non-
attunement, is to be linked to the bodily make up of vertebrates
at large, with the basic distinction between an internal body as a
source of excitation and an external body as a motoric means of
responding to this excitation in an attempt to diminish it, (iii) that
it is relevant to introduce here the Freudian distinction between
understanding and judging, and to identify understanding with
the articulated motor-patterns of the external body that aim at
grasping (com-prehending), and the judging with a dynamics
of the mark, in which it is indicated (marked) that something
stays together as a Thing exactly to the extent that it is not
understood, not grasped through adequate motor-patterns, (iv)
that mental representations (signifiers), understood as phonemic
motor packages, are inscribed into this bodily dynamics of
non-attunement, which means that they are particular motor-
forms attempting to grasp that from which they are initially and
structurally disconnected (the Thing), (v) that this distinction
between understanding and judging, combined with the idea
that signifiers or mental representations are motor-patterns,
provides us with a basis to identify processes of repetition
(Wiederholungszwang) in terms of repeated attempts situated at
the level of the marks, structurally disconnected from what is
satisfying at the level of needs, (vi) that the initial helplessness of
the infant, together with the subtlety of language, with its (small
and flexibly recombinable) phonemic motor-packages offered by
the other/the Other, is the means through which the categorical
difference between humans and other vertebrates can be made
clinically relevant, and finally, (vii) that the representational
grasping movement corresponds to objectification, whereby the
object expresses the formal readiness of the representational
space, a readiness that can be, in secondary instance, filled up in
various ways, but that, due to the initial non-attunement in which
it is grounded, is structurally missing the Thing that it initially
marked, leading to an endless compulsion to repeat, without
which? There would be no humanity, no culture, no subjective
life.
In sum, we have argued for the inscription of the dynamics
of signifiers in the structural non-attunement that already exists
between actions and needs in mammals, leading to the repetition
of actions independently from their being useful or not. Our
purpose thereby was not at all to diminish the specificity of
the human condition as a speaking condition. On the contrary,
our purpose was thereby to show that we are tempted, time
and again, to interpret human behavior too quickly as guided
by intentional, consciously guided principles and mechanisms.
Signifier repetition is the basic human condition, not intentional
behavior! That is what Lacan stresses over and again, linked to the
nature and the functioning of the signifier. In this way, Lacan’s
viewpoint operates, more explicitly than Freud’s, a categorical
shift from the idea that man is or should be guided by what
brings satisfaction to his needs, to the idea that man is driven to
repeat what was structurally missed. In speaking of a “conceptual
intrusion” in relation to the compulsion to repeat, Lacan focuses
on what constitutes the mental as a specific kind of object. In
this, he wishes to “ensure,” “faire valoir” Freud (Lacan, 1966–
1967/2017, XIII, p. 280) in what he was eventually after – the
subject of the unconscious – and that is exactly the mental
apparatus with as a module the compulsion to repeat.
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on the signifier and on jouissance by AB. She is then second
main author. The collaborative work between both these authors
was intense and the result can be called a common result. SD
contributed with her doctoral research on jouissance and the
compulsion to repeat, part of the research background that served
as a basis for this reflective article.
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